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IGNOU MSOE 002 FREE Solved Assignment 2022-23 PDF 

IGNOU MSOE 002 FREE Solved Assignment 2022-23 PDF  : MSOE 002 Solved Assignment 2022 , MSOE 002 Solved Assignment 2022-23, MSOE 002 Assignment 2022-23, MSOE 002 Assignment, IGNOU Assignments 2022-23- Gandhi National Open University had recently uploaded the assignments of the present session for MEG Programme for the year 2022-23. Students are recommended to download their Assignments from this webpage itself.

Section-1

1. Briefly examine the nature of Jewish Diaspora. 

Ans. The Jewish diaspora or exile  is the dispersion of Israelites or Jews out of their ancient ancestral homeland (the Land of Israel) and their subsequent settlement in other parts of the globe.

In terms of the Hebrew Bible, the term “Exile” denotes the fate of the Israelites who were taken into exile from the Kingdom of Israel during the 8th century BCE, and the Judahites from the Kingdom of Judah who were taken into exile during the 6th century BCE. While in exile, the Judahites became known as “Jews” (יְהוּדִים, or Yehudim), “Mordecai the Jew” from the Book of Esther being the first biblical mention of the term.

The first exile was the Assyrian exile, the expulsion from the Kingdom of Israel (Samaria) begun by Tiglath-Pileser III of Assyria in 733 BCE. This process was completed by Sargon II with the destruction of the kingdom in 722 BCE, concluding a three-year siege of Samaria begun by Shalmaneser V. The next experience of exile was the Babylonian captivity, in which portions of the population of the Kingdom of Judah were deported in 597 BCE and again in 586 BCE by the Neo-Babylonian Empire under the rule of Nebuchadnezzar II.

A Jewish diaspora existed for several centuries before the fall of the Second Temple, and their dwelling in other countries for the most part was not a result of compulsory dislocation. Before the middle of the first century CE, in addition to Judea, Syria and Babylonia, large Jewish communities existed in the Roman provinces of Egypt, Crete and Cyrenaica, and in Rome itself; after the Siege of Jerusalem in 63 BCE, when the Hasmonean kingdom became a protectorate of Rome, emigration intensified. In 6 CE the region was organized as the Roman province of Judea. The Judean population revolted against the Roman Empire in 66 CE in the First Jewish–Roman War which culminated in the destruction of Jerusalem in 70 CE. During the siege, the Romans destroyed the Second Temple and most of Jerusalem. This watershed moment, the elimination of the symbolic centre of Judaism and Jewish identity motivated many Jews to formulate a new self-definition and adjust their existence to the prospect of an indefinite period of displacement.

In 132 CE, Bar Kokhba led a rebellion against Hadrian, a revolt connected with the renaming of Jerusalem as Aelia Capitolina. After four years of devastating warfare, the uprising was suppressed, and Jews were forbidden access to Jerusalem.

During the Middle Ages, due to increasing migration and resettlement, Jews divided into distinct regional groups which today are generally addressed according to two primary geographical groupings: the Ashkenazi of Northern and Eastern Europe, and the Sephardic Jews of Iberia (Spain and Portugal), North Africa and the Middle East. These groups have parallel histories sharing many cultural similarities as well as a series of massacres, persecutions and expulsions, such as the expulsion from England in 1290, the expulsion from Spain in 1492, and the expulsion from Arab countries in 1948–1973. Although the two branches comprise many unique ethno-cultural practices and have links to their local host populations (such as Central Europeans for the Ashkenazim and Hispanics and Arabs for the Sephardim), their shared religion and ancestry, as well as their continuous communication and population transfers, has been responsible for a unified sense of cultural and religious Jewish identity between Sephardim and Ashkenazim from the late Roman period to the present.

2. Describe the migration patterns of Indian Diaspora to the Gulf region.

Ans. India is the largest country of origin of international migrants as well as the world’s top recipient of remittances. Since the 1970s “oil boom,” Indian migration to the Gulf has served as a valuable source of income for the nation and as the backbone of the economies of high-migration states such as Kerala through the transfer of remittances. During this time, Indian migrant workers have made substantial contributions to the economic development of the Gulf States.

However, the increasing international scrutiny and condemnation of the treatment of blue-collar and domestic expatriate workers in the region in recent years has cast India-Gulf migration in a far less favorable light, prompting greater attention by the Government of India  to diaspora affairs and worker welfare issues. Yet, complaints received from and on behalf of migrant workers regarding various forms of abuse, exploitation, and hardship persist.

Meanwhile, the outlow of Indian migrants to the region has slackened while return migration has increased due to economic slowdowns, fluctuating oil prices, and changes in Gulf labor policies. The future of India-Gulf migration is further clouded by the Coronavirus pandemic, which poses unprecedented health and livelihoods challenges for the millions of Indians working in the Gulf, as well as for the families and communities that depend on them — and which presents a daunting test for the Indian government.

The declining number of Indians departing for work in the Gulf stems from a variety of factors at both ends of the migration corridor. The narrowing of wage differentials is one of them. Indeed, wage stagnation mainly due to sluggish oil prices has made the Gulf States less attractive destinations than in the past. Another factor has been the implementation of programs to increase the employment of nationals in the private sector. Nationalization policies have resulted in shrinking job opportunities for Indian migrants and those from other South Asian countries as well. Meanwhile, work permit renewal fees and taxes in the Gulf have increased, driving up the cost of living. The cost of utilities and basic goods has likewise risen. The shrinking number of migrants heading to the Gulf is also partly attributable to the tightening of the procedures for sending workers abroad by the Indian government. In May 2015, the GoI  introduced a computerized system called “e-Migrate” to regulate overseas employment. In recent years, the Indian government also set minimum referral wages (MRWs) to regulate the wages of Indian migrant workers employed in various capacities (e.g., as carpenters, masons, drivers, fitters, nurses, and domestic workers) in the six Gulf States as well as 12 other “emigration check required” (ECR) countries (i.e., those whose labor standards are identified as not migrant-friendly). Although both measures were instituted to safeguard the interests of those seeking contractual employment abroad, there is anecdotal evidence that they have had the perverse effect of making Indian workers less attractive for recruiters and employers.

Paradoxically, remittances grew by over 14% in 2018 to $78.6 billio despite the overall slowdown in Indian migration to the region. Several factors could account for the continuing healthy inflow of financial resources from the Gulf. The first is the sheer number of Indians who remain under contract and still remit a significant portion of their earnings. The second is the depreciation of the rupee. The third is that some recently returned migrants have brought the wealth generated in the Gulf back to the country. The fourth is that, as data regarding Indian migrants from Kerala have shown, many migrant workers in the Gulf have ‘climbed the social ladder,’ garnering higher wages that have enabled them to remit larger sums. And the fifth is that the Indian expatriate population in the Gulf includes a sizeable number of high-income earners whose remittances are not captured by the official migration data.

A second important change has been in the relative contribution by sending states of low-skilled workers to the Gulf labor market. Over the past decade, the number of blue collar Keralites migrating to the Gulf for work has plummeted by 90%. A recent study of migration trends and patterns focusing on Kerala — for decades a leading source of expatriate labor to the Gulf — concluded that “emigration from Kerala is falling and return migration is on the rise. The long history of migration from Kerala to the Gulf is in its last phase.” Today, the space once occupied by Kerala is dominated by Uttar Pradesh (UP), Bihar, Rajasthan, and Tamil Nadu — the first three ranked as low-income states (LIS) where declining job prospects in the formal and informal sectors appear to be feeding the growth in the number of workers heading to the Gulf.

 
3. What are the five patterns of Indian emigration? 

Ans. Five Patterns of Indian Emigration: In India, we find five patterns of emigration, namely, indentured labour emigration, free or passage emigration, brain-drain or voluntary emigration and labour emigration to West Asia.

While the last two have resulted due to the contradictions of the post-colonial socio-economic development of the country, the first three occurred during the colonial period.

Indentured Labour Emigration: The Indian indenture system was an ongoing system of indenture by which thousands of Indians were transported to various colonies of European powers to provide labour for the (mainly sugar) plantations.

Kangani/Maistry Labour Emigration: The kangani (derived from Tamil kankani, meaning foreman or overseer) system prevailed in the recruitment of laboun for emigration to Ceylon and Malaya.

A variant of this system called the maistry (derived from Tamil maistry, meaning supervisor) system was practised in the recruitment of labour for emigration to Burma.

Under these systems, the kangani or maistry (himself an Indian immigrant) recruited families of Tamil labourers from villages in the erstwhile Madras Presidency.

Under these systems, the labourers were legally free, as they were not bound by any contract or fixed period of service.

Passage Emigration: These systems – indentured and maistry or kangani, which began in the first and third quarter of the 19th century, were abolished in 1938.

Emigration from India did not cease after the abolition of indenture and other systems of organized export of labour.

There was a steady trickle of emigration of members of trading communities from Gujarat and Punjab to South Africa and East Africa (Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda), and those from South India to South East Asia.

Most labourers emigrated to East Africa to work on the railroad construction. These emigrants were not officially sponsored: they themselves paid their “passage” and they were “free” in the sense that they were not bound by any contract.

 “Brain Drain”: The UNDP estimates that India loses $2 billion a year because of the emigration of computer experts to the U.S. Indian students going abroad for their higher studies costs India a foreign exchange outflow of $10 billion annually.

Human capital flight, more commonly referred to as “brain drain”, is the large-scale emigration of a large group of individuals with technical skills or knowledge.

The reasons usually include two aspects which respectively come from countries and individuals.

In terms of countries, the reasons may be social environment (in source countries: lack of opportunities, political instability, economic depression, health risks; in host countries: rich opportunities, political stability and freedom, developed economy, better living conditions).

In terms of individual reasons, there are family influences (overseas relatives, and personal preference: Preference for exploring, ambition for an improved career, etc).

Although the term originally referred to technology workers leaving a nation, the meaning has broadened into: “the departure of educated or professional people from one country, economic sector, or field for another, usually for better pay or living conditions”.

Labour Emigration to West Asia: Entire gulf region is sparsely populated, Saudi Arabia and Iraq being the only Gulf countries with a relatively large population of almost 22 and 23 million, respectively.

Section-II

4. Discuss the role of Bollywood in the representation of the Indian diaspora. 

Ans. Popular Hindi cinema has, since the first film was made in India in 1913, played a central role in the formulation of the national identity and in the promotion of normative behaviour. So much so that ‘film is perhaps the single strongest agency for the creation of a national mythology of heroism, consumerism, leisure, and sociality’. However, the low-brow, elusive and largely unrealistic nature of the screenplays confined the study of the films’ social, cultural and political implications to a footnote in historical and sociological works for several decades. In this context, the unrelenting interest political parties and successive Indian governments have taken in the production of exemplarity on the big screen and in the control, mostly through censorship and taxation, of cinema is striking. Then, in the 1990s, the rise of Hindu nationalism, the liberalization of the Indian economy and the renewed affection of the Indian middle class for cinema halls, previously deserted in favour of home entertainment, generated more production and more revenue. This period coincided with a new academic interest in Bollywood. Reputed writers specializing in the theory of globalization and cultural studies like Arjun Appadurai and Carol Breckenridge, although their analysis of cultural consumption and Indian modernity is not based on cinema, nonetheless started to take into account the importance of the big screen in the national imagination. To quote the words of D. Bhoopaty, ‘cinema is widely considered a microcosm of the social, political, economic, and cultural life of a nation. It is the contested site where meanings are negotiated, traditions made and remade, identities affirmed or rejected’. Besides, a growing number of studies by Jyotika Virdi, M. Madhava Prasad, Sumita Chakravarty, Tejaswini Niranjana, Ashish Rajadhyaksha, Rustom Bharucha, Patricia Uberoi, Anthony Alessandrini, Ravi Vasudevan and Rachel Dwyer and Christopher Pinney insist on the concurrence between India’s political and social history and its cinema.

2Indeed popular Indian cinema in Hindi constitutes a particularly interesting area of study as much because of its history as because of its key role in the creation of the national identity and its place in the collective imagination. Directors, producers, distributors, financiers, officials in the Central Board of Film Certification (Censor Board) all seek to ensure the projection of lucrative, aesthetically pleasant and acceptable contents. This results in a prescriptive and normative body of works that have, over the years, reflected and mostly shaped ideas of national identity, gendered behaviour, and acceptability. As Ashis Nandy noted, ‘the popular film is low-brow, modernizing India in all its complexity, sophistry, naiveté and vulgarity. Studying popular film is studying Indian modernity at its rawest, its crudities laid bare by the fate of traditions in contemporary life and arts. Above all, it is studying caricatures of ourselves’. These distorted reflections, one might add, not only exaggerate features but also paradoxically dictate patterns of normality. In this sense, they shape and impose exemplarity by broadcasting role models, figures of idealization and identification at once. Popular cinema is thus a major actor of social engineering.

3The character of the expatriate Indian perfectly illustrates this phenomenon. Once exposed as a counter-model, it became in the past twenty years the symbol of the Indian achiever, a kind of über Indian able to assert his ethnic and national identity in a globalized world: successful, capitalist, male, family-oriented, technology-savvy and a devout Hindu all at once. A few films like Dilwale Dulhania Le Jayenge (DDLJ, Aditya Chopra 1995), Pardes (Subhash Ghai 1997), Kuch Kuch Hota Hai (Karan Johar 1998), Kabhi Khushi Kabhie Gham (K3G, Karan Johar 2001), Kitne Door… Kitne Paas (Mehul Kumar 2002) and Namastey London (Vipul Amrutlal Shah 2007) have given him pride of place and have generated new practices (fashion trends, tourism in the locations shown on screen, see Ramdya 2009) or rejuvenated old ones (like the rekindled observance of the Karva Chauth festival in Northern India). The elites of the popular Hindi film industry, like producer-director Yash Chopra, are very conscious of their role. He for instance declared, during his address at the first Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (PBD), a government-sponsored conclave for the Indian diaspora, that ‘our moral responsibility is to depict India at its best. We’re the historians of India. The Indian Diaspora must maintain its identity, its roots’ (Chopra 2003).

4A very culturalist, essentialist and majoritarian view of Indian identity underlines this assertion. Ethnic nationalism and pan-Indianism gained currency during the 1990s while the country’s economy was being opened up after the first liberalization measures in 1991, which benefited most the middle classes and the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The party’s slogan ‘India Shining’, a peon to urban, yuppie, capitalist growth embodied by the IT sector, symbolized this period. Hence it is not surprising that the Non Resident Indian (NRI), who is imagined to be necessarily rich and westernized but who is also known to contribute financially to the Sangh Parivar, became a role model for a fast growing middle class facing the challenges of globalization and its own anguish or feeling of guilt due to a possible acculturation. Unsurprisingly, the popularity of themes related to the diaspora and the nationalist ethnic and cultural discourse aimed at people of Indian origin living abroad reached a peak during the period corresponding to the BJP-led governments (1998-2004). The 1990s and early 2000s could in fact be considered the Golden Age of the NRI, heralded as the emblem of the emerging middle class and the new material aspirations of an India in the midst of economic liberalization.

5In this context, Indian culture is portrayed as family-oriented, Hindu, the preserve of women within the home and yet ‘portable’  thus possibly transnational. Cinema, more than other media like television, mobile phones or the Internet, constitutes a medium for the enacting, teaching and dissemination of this nationalist discourse heralding the combined virtues of consumerism and devotion and of cosmopolitanism and roots. Chopra confirms this when he confides that ‘Indian films teach in a subtle way, they teach the social conventions, a sense of duty’ (Chopra 2002). This paper shall therefore go beyond the synoptic description and focus on the lessons in Indian identity and desirable conduct given in the last fifteen years through one of Yash Chopra’s favourite characters: the NRI. Once unloved and portrayed as the epitome of moral corruption, he became in the past fifteen years the embodiment of the national ethos as well as of a triumphant capitalism.

5. Why are Indians considered a model minority in the USA.

Ans. In 1978, several years after leaving India and coming to Texas, my parents decided to move out of our middle-class neighborhood in southwest Houston. Our new home, a few miles away, was a custom-designed contemporary structure on a one-acre lot in the exclusive Piney Point Village, population 3,419, a community that vies for the title of “richest city in Texas.” We had a swimming pool and a three-car garage, where my dad, an immaculately tailored allergist, parked his silver Cadillac and my mom parked her ivory Mercedes. We had, quite clearly, arrived.

Like countless other immigrants, my parents had come to the United States, in 1969, with little cash in hand. Within a few years, my devout Hindu mother, orphaned at an early age, had switched from a sari to tennis skirts and was competing at Houston’s swankiest clubs. My father, who hadn’t owned a pair of shoes until he was 10, was buying season tickets to the Houston Symphony, where he promptly fell asleep during every performance.

Our world was filled with Indian doctors and engineers. We never stopped to ask why their entrance into American society had been so rapid. We simply accepted that their success was a combination of immigrant pluck and the right values: Indians were family-oriented, education-oriented, and work-oriented.

There was a term for our place in the country’s racial order: model minority. The concept is generally traced to a 1966 article in The New York Times Magazine by the sociologist William Petersen, which focused on Japanese Americans; the basic idea was extended to other Asian Americans. Of course, the notion of “model minorities” comes with a flip side—“problem minorities.” The terminology took on life at a time of intense social unrest: race riots across the country, the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr., the emergence of Richard Nixon’s racially charged “southern strategy.” Many Americans were losing what faith they may have had in the possibility of racial equality.

Today, it’s easy to take for granted the measures of Indian American success: the ubiquity of the “Dr. Patel” stereotype; the kids who, year in and year out, dominate the Scripps National Spelling Bee; a vice president–elect, Kamala Harris, whose mother was Indian; and, most notably, the median annual household income, which is among the highest of any group. Nikki Haley, Donald Trump’s former ambassador to the United Nations, whose parents arrived in the U.S. in the late ’60s, summed up one prevailing view this way: “Mostly we’re just good at being Americans.”

 

 

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